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Background: The European financial crisis has affected most of the EU member 
states, and European institutions have had to create new financial instruments to 
counter the impact. Most effects in the economic and political spheres can be 
attributed to high unemployment and changes in governments in peripheral 
countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Romania). Objectives: The aim of this 
paper is to demonstrate the economic and political effects of the European 
financial crisis in some peripheral countries that have implemented austerity policies. 
Methods/Approach: The methodology used is mixed: an analysis of the primary 
economic variables of the selected countries in comparison to those of countries 
with low-risk premium was performed, and the relation between the bailouts and 
elections was presented. Results: The exacerbation of the crisis in the Eurozone is 
mainly due to the high political costs of austerity measures and not the high level of 
public spending and/or the alternations in the governments of peripheral countries. 
Conclusions: The European financial crisis is primarily a result of weak economic 
governance, and its effects are differentiated. The peripheral countries possess the 
highest rates of unemployment, and there is a higher tendency towards political 
instability in rescued countries. 
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Introduction  
In 1999, the Euro was launched and scarcely ten years later (2009), had the 
European Union (EU) encountered a banking and sovereign debt crisis that had 
substantial spill-over effects on national politics and the quality of life of most citizens. 
When the euro was launched in early 1999, some experts were optimistic about this 
important development viewed by many as a powerful sign of a closer European 
integration. As a major development, the introduction of the Euro brought certain 
expectations, such as: increase in cross-border competition, promoted structural 
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a while, investors believed that the risk associated to all members of the Eurozone 
was practically the same, and it became cheaper for countries such as Greece to 
borrow from the international market. In 2009, the risk premium soared for peripheral 
countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Romania). In this paper, we refer to 
“peripheral” countries as those who joined the EU after the 6 original members, are 
geographically distant from central-Europe, and have had problems with economic 
instability. 
 The depth and severity of this crisis is disturbing. The economic and political 
consequences of the crisis are pervasive. Even a small Eurozone country with 
economic problems can destabilize a larger country and the financial instability can 
become widespread. In addition, the European institutions have been criticized for 
not responding assertively and appropriately to the crisis. Greece (2010), Ireland 
(2010), Portugal (2011), Spain (2012), and Cyprus (2012) have been bailed-out 
(rescued financially).  
 European voters have punished governments in all peripheral Eurozone countries, 
and there have been important changes. In Spain, Mariano Rajoy, from the people’s 
party (PP) won the 2011 elections in Spain from an eight-year, incumbent, left-wing 
government led by Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. The case of France is also 
interesting, in 2012, Sarkozy, a centre-right partisan (UMP), was the first incumbent 
defeated since 1981, and Francois Hollande, representing the socialist party, 
became the first President of France, since Mitterrand. This shift in power also had an 
impact on the Franco-German axis; Sarkozy was a crucial ally of Angela Merkel, 
while Hollande’s difference of opinion with regards to the European crisis has made it 
difficult for them to find common ground.   
 The European crisis has had an adverse impact on most Member States, and 
countries in the Eurozone have been particularly affected. However, peripheral 
countries such as Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain have been the worst hit 
countries in the EU. This crisis has introduced not only economic but also political and 
social problems. The weak economic governance in the Eurozone largely 
contributed to the crisis, and the Troika (European Central Bank, European 
Commission and the International Monetary Fund) was formed to organize the 
bailouts. The political consequences of the crisis were substantial and led to power 
shifts in many European countries, among them Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Greece and 
Italy. The population did not welcome the austerity measures introduced by the 
Troika and many protests ensued. Concerning the social consequences of the crisis, 
in mid-2013 the unemployment rate in Spain was 26.7% and in Greece 27.3%.  
 Scholars have debated the main causes and consequences of the European 
crisis. Some of them focused on the economic effects, others on the political impact, 
and several on the social implications. This paper emphasizes the economic and 
political consequences of the crisis, focusing on the strong link between them. 
Several European governments were forced to relinquish power due to the 
implementation of austerity measures by the Troika while in other countries the crisis 
exacerbated their existing problems, and heads of state or government had to 
resign. Overall, the crisis has adumbrated the failures of the European economic 
governance to respond promptly and adequately when faced with an important 
challenge. The negative effects of this crisis were not only present in the economy 
but also permeated throughout national politics. A stronger economic governance 
and greater economic policy-coordination is essential for the EU. Has the European 
financial crisis affected differentially the EU countries? Are the peripheral countries 
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Literature review 
Weak economic governance in the Eurozone and the European financial crisis  
The requirements that must be met by countries that share a single currency are 
listed in the literature on optimum currency areas (Saucedo, Bacaria, Fortuno, 2012). 
Several studies show that the Eurozone is not an optimal currency area (De Grauwe, 
Heens, 1993; Bayoumi, Eichengreen, 1997; Fidrmuc, Korhonen, 2003) and members of 
the currency area no longer have their monetary policies. The European Central 
Bank (ECB) implements a monetary policy that is not optimal for various members of 
the Eurozone; such countries utilized the instrument of fiscal policy to offset the loss of 
monetary policy. 
 Our argument is that the misuse of fiscal policies in the Eurozone (excessive public 
deficits and public debts) was not the main factor that contributed to the European 
sovereign debt crisis (Bordo, Meissner, Stuckler, 2010), but rather the weak European 
economic governance is at fault (Featherstone, 2011). The crisis that started in the 
housing sector in US was the catalyst of the European financial crisis, but there were 
weak structural conditions in the European economic governance. The argument 
focuses on the following: 
 1. Institutional weakness in the implementation of fiscal discipline: the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) is an instrument that was designed and promoted by Germany to 
its neighbours with recurrent instability problems, and was not observed initially by 
France and Germany. The European institutions failed to fulfil the SGP in practice, so 
when larger countries in the Eurozone failed to comply the SGP, there were no 
incentives for the peripheral countries to comply. The SGP did not work from the start, 
because there was a breach that did not involve any sanctions by the European 
institutions, although there was a possibility to apply a financial penalty. 
 2. German policy of beggar-thy-neighbour: prior to the European crisis, Germany 
implemented a labour reform that reduced its labour costs, which made it more 
competitive with its neighbours in the Eurozone through increased exports. Trade 
deficits increased for most European countries, while Germany increased its trade 
surplus. These adverse shifts in the balance of payments and the differential 
competitiveness could not continue in the long term in a currency area where 
countries already had their monetary and exchange rate policies (Lane, 2012). The 
economic governance is weak and the European institutions did not anticipate that 
the differential in competitive positions could cause problems in the sovereign debt 
market.  
 3. Self-fulfilling market sentiments (negative): in a monetary union, members 
generate debt in a currency that cannot issue it; this situation does not happen in 
countries with their own central banks, so there is a higher probability of a liquidity 
problem in countries that share a common currency. The liquidity problem can turn 
into a solvency problem in times of recession due to falling tax revenues and 
increased government spending, which generates an increase in the public deficit 
(De Grauwe, Ji, 2013). This situation creates uncertainty in the markets if countries 
default and impact sovereign debt markets with a rise in the risk premium generated 
by the same financial markets (De Grauwe, Ji, 2013). The weakness in European 
economic governance is evident in view of the vulnerability of countries that are 
members of a monetary union and lack mechanisms to counteract the negative 
sentiments of the markets that exacerbated the crisis. The prohibition of European 
bailouts is another of the failures of European governance (Dabrowski, 2010), since it 
created further uncertainty in financial markets, although funds launched in recent 
years have improved the situation. Moreover, the decision of the President of the 
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willing to buy the necessary sovereign debt to reduce the risk premium of the 
peripheral countries, eased the anxiety in the markets. 
 The above three structural elements are part of the weakness in the economic 
governance of the Eurozone. When the crisis hit the housing sector in the US, the 
structural conditions for a sovereign debt crisis were present. The economic recession 
of 2009 in the Eurozone was the catalyst for the increase in risk premiums for most 
peripheral European countries. The theoretical argument is that high deficits of the 
peripheral countries of the Eurozone were not the cause of the crisis, but rather the 
product of it, and the origin can be traced to the weak economic governance. 
Economic voting  
 The literature on economic voting orbits around notions that voters reward or 
punish the governments with their votes. Many scholars have focused their research 
on the change in support for the head of state or government. However, others 
have emphasized that there can be a change in support for a political party or a 
coalition. For Lewis-Beck and Nadeau (2011), the economy is a valence issue for the 
electorate. That does not mean that it is the only issue important to them, but rather 
that it is a priority in most cases depending on the context. Terrorism and security are 
also important to voters and can decrease voter’s attention on economic 
performance. According to Singer (2011) “economic issues rise in importance during 
recessions or periods of volatility; they fade in importance when citizens perceive 
crisis in other areas of government performance; and citizens who are vulnerable to 
the effects of economic shifts give greater weight to economic importance in 
evaluating incumbents”.  
 In the EU, citizens have suffered adverse consequences generated by the global 
financial crisis (e.g. US), the banking crisis (e.g. Ireland), and the sovereign debt crisis 
(e.g. Greece), among others. The economic and political decisions taken by 
government officials have had important repercussions on the quality of their 
lifestyles. Citizens and politicians protested against the austerity measures introduced 
by the Troika, and as a consequence, in some countries, their heads of state or 
government had to resign. Some assert that the European integration can influence 
national vote choice (Evans 2002; Tillman, 2004), while others just as positively assert 
that it has virtually no effect (Mair, 2000; Sitter, 2001).  
 The political effects of the economic crisis at the supranational level (i.e. the 
European institutions) could be analysed vis-a-vis the 2014 European Parliament 
elections to determine whether or not economic voting influenced the electorates. 
In most cases, the supranational decisions, mainly concerning the austerity measures 
imposed for the bailouts had a negative effect on national politics, and 
consequently, some members of governments had to resign (e.g. Portugal, Ireland, 
Greece and Romania). In other countries, the heads of government relinquished 
their posts (e.g. Italy) in response to intense pressure from financial markets and 
European institutions. As noted by Kriesi (2012), governments were severely limited by 
the constraints imposed on them by international pressure. The manoeuvring space 
did not allow them to make concessions to deal with their demands. For the purpose 
of this paper, the political consequences of the economic crisis in Portugal, Ireland, 
Greece, Italy and Romania are analysed at the national level in order to 
demonstrate how, in some countries, the economic crisis merely amplified existing 
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Methodology  
The text addresses some of the economic and political effects of the European 
financial crisis, and it was deemed necessary to analyse some EU countries. The idea 
was to employ a mixed methodology that includes both the analysis of the main 
economic variables and changes in government caused by the crisis. 
Data 
Most of the data in this paper originates mainly from primary sources. The economic 
data utilized was collected from different international organizations and the 
information about election results in the selected countries stems from official 
sources. In Table 1, all of the data to depict the economic and political 
consequences is presented by variable and source. 
 
Table 1 





Economic  Economic growth International Monetary Fund, World Economic 
Outlook Database 
Economic  Government 
spending 
International Monetary Fund, World Economic 
Outlook Database 
Economic  Unemployment rate International Monetary Fund, World Economic 
Outlook Database, OECD Short-Term Labour 
Market Statistics and OECD Economic 
Outlook Databases 
Economic  Labour costs AMECO Database, European Commission 




Political Austerity measures 
and bailouts  
International Monetary Fund, European 
Union. 
Source: Authors’ analysis 
Methods 
In the economic analysis, the variables of government spending, unemployment, 
and labour costs were analysed. Two types of countries were included; the first 
group are competitive and low unemployment countries (Germany and Finland), 
where the crisis had no significant effect, while the second group is comprised of 
countries with high unemployment rates and low competitiveness (Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain) where the crisis had devastating effects. Another 
difference between the groups is that the first group has a low risk premium, whereas 
the countries of the second group have high-risk. 
 In the political analysis, countries where the crisis and austerity measures affected 
changes in governments are presented. We selected Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Italy 
and Romania to illustrate the political effects of the financial crisis. For each of the 
above-mentioned countries the authors analyse the circumstances attendant upon 
the ousting of heads of state or government---those who were removed, in notable 
cases, due to a lack of support from their parliaments that precipitated early 
elections. Another variable that is important is the bailouts, because three countries 
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implementation of austerity policies. The Italian case interests the authors because 
the markets influenced the fall of the prime minister. Alternately, the case of 
Romania is noteworthy because the conditions (austerity) attached to the loan 
requested by the Prime Minister were an important factor that determined his 
continuation in power.  
 
Results  
Economic consequences  
The EU is facing one of the worst economic crises of the past 60 years of history. The 
current crisis has placed the EU in a vulnerable position regarding international 
investors and demonstrated the system failures of an incomplete Monetary Union. 
European economic governance has been seriously questioned for its lacklustre 
reaction to recent problems. 
 The current crisis is the product of two other crises: the financial crisis that began in 
September 2008 with the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in the US which rapidly 
spread to the rest of the world, and the sovereign debt crisis that initiated in October 
2009 when the former Greek Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou stated that the 
Greek public deficit was higher than what had been announced months before by 
the previous prime minister. The 2009-2012 period has been catastrophic for the EU in 
general, but mainly for the peripheral countries, because they have fallen into an 
economic downturn.   
 The launch of the euro impacted the risk associated with each of the countries 
belonging to the euro area. In other words, there was a convergence in the risk 
premium among all members of the Economic Monetary Union (EMU). In order to 
enter the EMU, euro area members have to pass the same economic tests, but the 
different characteristics of the economies of the Eurozone do not correspond to the 
same risk.  
    Interest rates on bonds of Eurozone governments converged from 1995 to1999. 
Since 1999, the risk associated with the bonds of Eurozone governments had been 
practically the same. The fact is that, although 12 countries shared the same 
currency, their economies did not necessarily have the same conditions. There were 
economies like Germany and Finland with high competitiveness which contrasted to 
others like Greece and Spain with low competitiveness. 
 In late 2008, the credit fell and investors observed the public finances of 
governments, very closely. From 2009 the risk premium increased for peripheral 
countries like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and to a lesser extent, Italy and Spain, but in 
the summer of 2012, the risk premium of the latter countries reached record levels. 
The ECB's decision to buy an unlimited debt in the secondary market in September 
of 2012 has helped to reduce the risk premium of the peripheral countries of the 
Eurozone; therefore, in the first quarter of 2013, there has been a significant decrease 
in the risk premium. 
 The economies of Ireland and Spain have already been bailed out in order to 
stabilize their financial systems. In the case of Spain, its "Cajas". Greece and Portugal, 
on the other hand, have been bailed-out to generate solvency, because these 
economies did not have enough liquidity to cover the payment of short-term bonds. 
In all four cases the bailouts were implemented after a significant increase in the risk 
premium. 
 Before the financial crisis broke, the Eurozone economy was growing around 2% 
per year. However, in 2009 there was a drop in the economic activity of 4%. Figure 1 
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illustrates how, after the fall in the economic activity of 2009, there was another 
descent to a lesser extent in 2012; the latter as a result of the sovereign debt crisis in 
peripheral countries. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
forecast of economic growth for the Eurozone in the coming years will be below 
1.5%. 
 Some experts have mentioned that the economic crisis in the Eurozone is a result 
of high spending in recent years. However, when comparing debt (% GDP) in the 
Eurozone with the US, from 2000 to 2008 the Eurozone debt remained stable (Figure 
2). The increase in debt, as a result of the financial crisis in late 2008, was lower in the 
Eurozone than in the US, so that argument cannot be entirely valid. 
  
Figure1 
Economic growth in the Eurozone and forecasts from 2013 to 2016 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013. 
 
Figure 2 
Government debt (% GDP) in the US and the Euro area 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013. 
 
 Public debt in the euro area members varies considerably with the Eurozone 
average. Figure 3 shows the public debt (% GDP) of some euro zone members. 
Countries like Greece and Italy have public debt with values close to 100% (% GDP) 
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With the financial crisis almost all countries increased their public debt; however 
countries like Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal had sharp increases. The 
sovereign debt problem is not due to the fact that the Eurozone has overspent, but 
due to the fact that some peripheral countries recorded increases in public debt. 
 In the US some states spend more than the average. However, the difference 
from the EU is that in the US there is an adjustment mechanism that serves the states 
with economic troubles, whereas in the EU there is no such mechanism. The US has a 
centralized budget that is more than 20% of its economy; while the EU’s budget is 1% 
(fiscal policy remains at national level). Although the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) was created, it cannot be compared to the adjustment mechanisms that exist 
in the US. 
 
Figure 3 
Government debt (% GDP) of some Euro area countries 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013. 
 
 The impact of the sovereign debt crisis has hit European countries, differently. The 
issue of unemployment is that wherein the greatest differences were observed in the 
Eurozone, because labour markets in the Eurozone have different degrees of 
flexibility (Bernal-Verdugo, Furceri, Guillaume, 2012). Figure 4 shows that Spain and 
Greece had high unemployment rates in 2012, with levels close to 25%, while 
Germany had an unemployment rate very close to 5%. Figure 4 also shows that from 
2008 there has been a substantial increase in the unemployment rate in countries like 
Spain, Greece and Portugal; in Germany the same metric has decreased.  
 Table 2 shows the current and projected unemployment rates in 2013 and 2014. 
The euro area will have an increase in the unemployment rate in 2014, but other 
countries will have a reduction from -0.87 (US) to -0.04 (Japan). Therefore, in 2014 
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Figure 4 
Unemployment rate of some Euro area countries 
 
 




Country  Current (May 2013) Projected (Q4 2014) Change (points) 
US 7.60 6.73 -0.87 
Canada 7.10 6.71 -0.39 
OECD 8.01 7.85 -0.16 
Japan 4.10 4.06 -0.04 
Euro area 12.20 12.26 0.06 
Source: OECD Short-Term Labour Market Statistics (http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/lfs-lms-data-en) 
and OECD Economic Outlook Database (http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eo-data-en) 
 
 The underlying problem in the Eurozone is the competitive gap among member 
states. Figure 5 shows that Unit Labour Costs (ULC) vary significantly in the Euro area 
because while in Germany the ULC have been decreasing considerably in the last 
decade (thereby becoming one of the most competitive countries, in Spain), 
Greece, Ireland and Italy their ULC have increased in the last decade. Since 2009, 
most countries in Figure 5 show a significant reduction of ULC. The difference in the 
competitiveness of euro area countries is significant, and it is one of the variables 
that explain notable vulnerability in that area. 
 Although members of the Eurozone share the same currency, the economic and 
financial results are different. Therefore, the financial problem of a small country can 
affect the entire Eurozone, while in the US, financial problems or a competitiveness 
gap in the states have no effect on the whole country, because there is an 
adjustment mechanism on a centralized budget which is greater than the one that 
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Figure 5 
Unit Labour Costs (nominal) of some Euro area countries 
 
Source: AMECO Database, European Commission 
 
 The issue of moral hazard has been mentioned in the bailouts that have occurred 
in the Eurozone (Jones, 2010; De Grauwe, 2011b). Countries that provide money for 
bailouts like Germany; have no incentive to grant money, because it creates the risk 
of generating bad behaviour in countries that receive the money. The outcome 
shows that there is moral hazard: solidarity is more complicated when the Federal 
State does not have a centralized budget. Gros and Mayer (2010) suggest the 
creation of a European Monetary Fund as a measure to bail out European countries. 
Other authors have highlighted that Europe needs some kind of Political Union (De 
Grauwe, 2011a) and the joint issue of Eurobonds. 
 The response of the European institutions has varied over time and has been 
differentiated. On the one hand, the ECB implemented programs to provide liquidity 
and to reduce the interest rate from the onset of the financial crisis. When the 
sovereign debt crisis began, the ECB bought government bonds to reduce risk 
premium, whereas in September of 2012 the president of the ECB bought the debt 
without limit, reducing the risk premium. On the other hand, the institutional response 
to stop public debt was the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, 
which further restricts the range of public deficit of the Eurozone countries.  
 Since 2010, the Troika (the ECB, the European Commission and the IMF) insisted on 
implementing austerity policies to the bailed-out countries. However, there has been 
a change in the discourse, since austerity measures were requested for longer 
periods and with more flexibility. The serious economic problems of Spain and 
Greece have caused a relaxation by the Troika in the pursuit of austerity. 
Political consequences  
    Since the beginning of the crisis, the Portuguese government had stated that it 
would not resort to an EU bailout. In March 2010, the Portuguese Parliament 
approved the first SGP that included a reduction in social spending, an increase in 
taxes for the wealthy, and the privatization of public companies, among others. Two 
months later, the Prime Minister of Portugal, Jose Socrates, was able to overcome a 
censure motion presented by the Marxist left politicians for his crisis measures. On 
March 11th, 2011, he presented his 4th austerity plan that was rejected by the 
opposition and provoked the resignation of his government. While still in office, in 
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began to negotiate with the IMF and the EU. On May 3rd, the Portuguese Prime 
Minister announced that the IMF-EU bailout rose up to €78 billion for three years. 
Nevertheless, the political tensions generated by the crisis became an insuperable 
obstacle for Socrates’ government. The Portuguese crisis broke out the day before 
the approval of the new Financial Stability Mechanisms in the euro zone. 
 In 2008, the fiscal banking crisis affected Ireland. Brian Cowen’s management as 
Prime Minister of the Irish Republic coincided with the financial and banking crisis of 
his country. The government tried by all means to avoid asking for external aid. The 
Eurozone members offered financial aid; however Cowen wanted to avoid a reform 
package with his creditors, which package was in fact a requirement of the bailout 
mechanism approved by the EU. Cowen had to abandon his first position due to the 
fear of the aid-associated demands. On November 22nd, 2010, the by-then Prime 
Minister of Ireland announced that the government had to increase taxes and lower 
expenses to admissible levels. Ireland had to be bailed out in November 2010 for 85 
billion Euros by the IMF and the EU in order to underpin its banking sector. After 
accepting the IMF-EU bailout, the Irish government sank, leaving the Prime Minister’s 
position unsustainable. According to a poll in Ireland, the bailout reached historical 
minimums with only 8% of satisfaction with the government’s performance. To the 
Irish people, a bailout meant national humiliation, betrayal and to surrender their 
autonomy to the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF. Shortly thereafter, 
Cowen turned in his resignation and called for snap elections. 
 In April 2010, the then Prime Minister of Greece, Georgios Papandreou, heir to a 
political dynasty, sought support from his European partners to reduce an inherited 
debt. During the crisis, Brussels fiercely pushed the Greek government to approve the 
bailout deal. The Greek people, outraged by cuts and austerity measures, protested 
in the streets and organized general strikes. The first bailout was not enough so a 
second bailout was necessary. In this precise context, Papandreou expressed his 
intention to hold a referendum on the European bailout plan and the membership of 
Greece in the Eurozone. The Greek Prime Minister was confident that the vote would 
confirm Greece as a member of the EU. The internal and external reaction was 
immediate to Papandreou’s announcement; it generated a market panic as well as 
anger from its European partners. Particularly, Germany and France pushed the 
Greek Prime Minister to return to the original plans of the bailout. Finally, Georgios 
Papandreou backed down to international pressure. This failure and the 
abandonment of his initiative forced him to resign in order to reach an agreement to 
form a new unity government in Greece. 
 In 2011, the Italian economy had been growing at 0.3% and public debt rose 
above 120% of GDP. In November 2011, the then Prime Minister of Italy, Silvio 
Berlusconi, immersed in lawsuits for fraud and sex scandals, resigned as Prime Minister 
of Italy after the EU and the markets forced him to resign as a prerequisite to their 
support for the Italian crisis. Indeed, the European crisis had achieved what the 
Italian liberal parties had failed to accomplish: the end of the reign of Berlusconi over 
the Italian political scene. Having lost the parliamentary majority, Berlusconi 
announced he would resign from his position after the budgets with the adjustments 
required by Brussels for 2012 were approved. No doubt the strong action of the 
President of Italy, Giorgio Napolitano, had achieved what seemed impossible to 
many: to speed up Berlusconi’s exit of power. Until the end, after 17 years in Italian 
politics, Berlusconi kept the tension in a country where economic and political times 
are difficult. 
 The crisis strongly affected Romania, which requested a loan of 20 billion Euros to 
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Minister, Emil Boc, included: reduction of the salaries of civil servants by a quarter 
and elevation of the VAT, among others. These measures were well received by the 
EU and the IMF, but strongly rejected by the Romanians. Consequently, Emil Boc 
resigned due to the mass protests that rejected the austerity measures backed by 
the IMF. 
 Internal and external pressures have created tensions at the political level, mainly 
in European governments, and some of them have not resisted the attack. The 
situation is critical, and the forced departure of governments has failed to 
ameliorate the European crisis. In some cases, it has had the opposite effect to the 
one expected and has worsened the political crisis. Undoubtedly, the European crisis 
has shown the fragility of the system and has claimed victims in its wake, 
overthrowing governments. 
 With the looming threat of contagion and the uncertainty of the Euro, European 
leaders decided to bailout the indebted countries like Greece. Countries like 
Germany initially disagreed with other Eurozone members with regard to the 
collective rescue of Greece. Germany’s position was simple: to exclude from the 
Eurozone those countries which did not respect the rules and threatened the euro. 
However, the European Commission, along with countries such as France, pressured 
the German Chancellor to reach an agreement. Later, France and Germany 
agreed a plan to bail-out Greece with the IMF and the Eurozone countries. 
 The crisis revealed shortcomings in the functioning of the Eurozone: The level of 
political and economic integration to support the euro is insufficient; there is a lack 
of cooperation among the members of the Eurozone; a tool to appropriately 
manage any crises was non-existent; there was a lack of control and supervision of 
the European Commission over the Public Accounts of member countries. 
 At the European Council in 2011, the 17 members of the Eurozone, along with the 
countries which aspired to join the EU, agreed to sign a new treaty that would 
establish strict limits on spending and government borrowing, including penalties for 
those governments that violated the limits. The other members of the EU were 
prepared to join the treaty, subject to parliamentary vote, except for the UK. 
 The Euro group’s role as coordinator and European economic governance body 
has become more important since the European crisis broke out. The Troika has 
imposed austerity measures to the bailed-out governments; its mission is to monitor 
the fulfilment of the program according to its commitments. Both actors play an 
important role in decision-making bodies, control and monitoring of the agreements 
reached at the respective bailouts requested by the European governments. In the 
European political scene, substantial changes can be observed before and after the 
European crisis. The European political reconfiguration is partly explained by the 
changes that arose as a result of internal and external political pressures. Some 
governments were overthrown by strikes and protests, others lost the support of their 
coalition governments, and some succumbed to external political pressures. 
 
Conclusions 
The global financial crisis led to a global credit crunch, although in developed 
countries it was even deeper. Despite the fact that it initiated in the housing sector in 
the US, in 2009 most developed countries had a sharp drop in production. And, 
Europe was no exception. Although manifest in several variations, all of the countries 
in the EU registered an economic contraction. 
 The launch of the Euro led to a convergence in the risk associated with the bonds 
of the Eurozone governments. The global financial crisis led to an increase in public 
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peripheral European countries. In 2010, a sovereign debt crisis began in the Eurozone 
and some countries were bailed out, like Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Greece and 
recently Cyprus. This crisis was not anticipated by the European institutions, and they 
created new tools to help the economic governance of the Eurozone--- most 
notably, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, the ESM, the 
establishment of the Troika and a new temporal function de facto of the ECB (the 
unlimited purchase of government debt in the secondary market.) 
 The crisis increased the sovereign debt of countries like Greece, Portugal, Spain, 
and Ireland, eventually leading them to request bailouts. The bailouts were granted 
with conditions (i.e. implementation of austerity policies of public spending, cuts and 
tax increases) which would ultimately cause an even steeper drop in economic 
activity. The economic consequences of the financial crisis were such that the 
unemployment rate in countries such as Spain (27.17%) and Greece (24.5%) 
increased to historic levels, which has led to social discontent. 
 The financial crisis caused poor economic performance in the EU Member States, 
which led to alternation of political parties in governments where elections were 
held, as in the case of France and the UK, among others. Also in some cases, the 
economic impact of the crisis led to call snap elections, as in Spain and Greece, 
while in Italy, having a high risk premium, the former Italian Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi was forced to resign, and a technical government headed by Mario 
Monti was installed. 
 The financial crisis in Europe has lasted more than four years, unemployment has 
increased mainly in the peripheral countries, there was an alternation of political 
parties in government, and internal migration has burgeoned within the borders of 
Europe. Finally, the financial crisis has led to an as-yet unfinished institutional change 
in the EU which has been the result of different preferences with respect to 
economic austerity. The Franco-German axis has been reconfigured; some fissures 
have spawned as a result of the preference of Germany for austerity policies and 
France for economic growth. In sum, the crisis differentially affected the EU countries, 
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